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Abstract: In this article I discuss the exercise of penal power in contemporary America 
with a view to explaining its historical causes, its contemporary forms and functions, 
and its social foundations. I argue that the leading characteristic of American penality 
today is not degradation, retribution, racial caste-making, or neoliberal discipline but 
instead the imposition of penal controls. The remainder of the article develops some 
hypotheses about the social and political roots of that distinctive form of punishment. 
Re-connecting penal controls with patterns of crime and violence, I highlight the 
 deficits of social control and social capital that set America off  from comparable 
nations and I trace the sources of these deficits to the structure and operation of certain 
American institutions as well as the limited capacities and patterned dispositions of 
the American state. 
Keywords: penality, political economy, criminal violence, social control, social deficits, 
state capacity, penal control, mass penal control.
How should we understand the extraordinary deployment of penal power that oper-
ates in the US today? That is the question I address in this article. I will approach it 
primarily as a research question, though it also has implications for criminal justice 
reform—a subject that is high on America’s political agenda at the present time.
Most of the existing research on this question is historical in nature, tracing the 
build-up of punishment from the 1970s to 2010. And most of it focuses on America’s 
very high rates of imprisonment or what has come to be known as ‘mass incarcera-
tion’. But here I want to address comparative as well as historical questions, and to 
consider other forms of penal power as well as incarceration. I want to ask why 
America is an international outlier on virtually every dimension of criminal punish-
ment, and to reflect on what this might tell us about the relationship of penal power 
to other forms of social control and state action. The analysis I present is schematic, 
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2 David Garland 
but I hope that a provisional and somewhat provocative outline will be of interest 
nevertheless. 
The comparative scholarship on penal policy is still at an early stage of development, 
but the most promising work associates cross-national differences in punishment with 
differences in levels of inequality (Wilkinson & Pickett 2009); differences in welfare 
state regimes (Cavadino & Dignan 2005); and differences in types of political  economy 
or ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Lacey 2007; Lacey & Soskice 2017).1 
It seems to me that these macro-social analyses point us in the right direction and 
I attempt to build on them in what follows. But they are primarily accounts of 
 correlations and covariance, and each grows vague when it comes to specifying the 
mechanisms and processes that link the macro-structures they discuss with the 
 phenomena of crime and punishment.2 One of the contributions I make here is to say 
a little more about these linkages—some of which become more apparent when we 
attend to the details of historical research on processes of penal change and social and 
economic transitions. And whereas each of these analyses associates penal policies 
with the social–structural contexts in which they develop, I also focus on the 
 problem-solving work that penal systems endeavour to do, and particularly their 
 relationship to  changing patterns of crime and violence.   
The explanatory framework I develop seeks, first, to reconnect America’s extra-
ordinary use of penal power with its distinctive levels of criminal violence and social 
problems, particularly those problems associated with social disorganisation and 
cumulative disadvantage, such as drug addiction, untreated mental illness, homeless-
ness, domestic violence, family breakdown, suicide, low birth weight, infant mortality, 
child poverty, and so on; second, to trace how these patterns of crime and punish-
ment—and more generally the social problems and state responses characteristic of 
the United States—have been structured over time by distinctive forms of government 
and political economy; and, third, to highlight the crucial role played by processes of 
informal social control—and by what I call ‘social control deficits’—in linking social 
and economic structures with the phenomena of crime and punishment. The aim of 
this framework is thus to connect penal policy with overarching structures of political 
economy but also with underlying patterns of violence, crime, and insecurity.
1 Other important contributions include: Whitman (2003); Sutton (2004); Lappi-Seppälä (2008); Pratt & 
Ericksson (2013) and the essays in Reitz (2017).
2 Recent work by Lacey & Soskice (2015; 2017) has begun to address this question of causal mechanisms 
with greater specificity. 
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ESTABLISHING THE PHENOMENON: 
AMERICA’S DISTINCTIVE USE OF PENAL POWER
I begin by specifying the thing to be explained: America’s distinctive deployment of 
penal power. There are at least six separate dimensions on which American  punishment 
is ‘exceptional’ or, as I would prefer to say, an outlier when viewed in a comparative 
perspective.3 
(i) Imprisonment rates: The per capita imprisonment rate of America as a whole is 
more than eight times higher than the Western European average (Walmsley 2016). 
And although there is great internal variation, the mildest US states have incarcera-
tion rates that are higher than the harshest of the Western European nations and 
higher than all but one of the Eastern European countries (Lappi-Seppälä 2008). 
(ii) Penal supervision: America’s use of correctional supervision is five times greater 
than the European average. It is also much more conditional and control-oriented. 
Probation and parole in the US today are not primarily forms of social assistance or 
social work: they are modes of constraint and control (Simon 19993; Rhine & Taxman 
2017; Van Zyl Smit & Corda 2017). 
(iii) Monetary penalties—criminal fines and reparations—are used much less 
 frequently in the US than in other Western jurisdictions (O’Malley 2009). Fines are 
deployed against corporations and traffic violators, but very rarely against individual 
felons and even misdemeanors are mostly dealt with by jail and probation rather than 
fines (Kohler Hausmann 2014; 2105).4 Moreover, when fines are used by criminal 
courts today, they are mostly ‘add-on’ sanctions, tagged onto a sentence of probation 
or jail—rather than stand-alone punishments. 
(iv) Extreme penalties: Thirty-one American states and the federal government 
still have the death penalty on their penal codes; there are currently some 2,900 
death-sentenced offenders on death row; and ten or twelve states still carry out 
 executions with some regularity. By contrast, no European nation any longer retains 
the death penalty (Garland 2010). More importantly—and again, quite distinctively, 
all fifty states and the federal government now sentence offenders to imprisonment for 
terms of Life Without Possibility of Parole (LWOP)—another extreme sentence that 
3 Many analysts talk of the ‘exceptional’ nature of American crime and punishment—see the contribu-
tions to Reitz (2107)—but as I argue in Garland (2010; 2017) this is not the most helpful way to frame 
the issues. On the US as an ‘Outlier Nation’ see Karabel & Laurison (2011). I also avoid the common 
tendency to describe US penality as comparatively ‘punitive’—because it seems to me that this term begs 
a number of questions; including the question of how patterns of punishment relate to underlying 
 patterns of crime. US penal practice is certainly degrading and harsh, perhaps distinctively so, but I will 
suggest that this is less the effect of a harsh culture (Whitman 2003) and more the outcome of a demand 
for maximum penal control in a context of minimalist public funding. 
4 In 2004 less than 1 per cent of federal felony cases resulted in a fine (O’Malley 2009). 
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is not permitted to nations that are signatories of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Currently there are approximately 50,000 American prison inmates 
sentenced to spend the whole of their natural lives in custody with no prospect of 
early release (Nellis 2013). 
(v) Sentence lengths and time served in prison are much longer in the US than 
 elsewhere. Lappi-Seppälä (2008; 2017) estimates that sentences of American courts 
are, on average, between three and four times longer than in Western Europe. And the 
likelihood of a custodial sentence following a criminal conviction is very much higher 
in the US than elsewhere (Subramanian & Shames 2013).  
(vi) Finally, there are collateral consequences—by which I mean the imposition of 
disqualifications, exclusions, banishment, deportation, and public criminal records as 
a consequence of a criminal conviction. These penal consequences are much more 
extensive and much more enduring in the US than elsewhere (Jacobs 2015; Demleitner 
2017). There are thousands of such provisions, many of them imposed by local 
 administrative laws and regulations (Travis 2002; Mauer & Chesney-Lind 2002).5 And 
though recent scholarship and advocacy have begun to bring them to public attention 
(Manza & Uggens 2006; Alexander 2010; Lerman & Weaver 2014), most of these 
measures are low-visibility restrictions, largely unknown to the general public. 
These then, are six dimensions along which American penality currently6 exhibits 
a distinctive, outlier status when compared with other Western nations.7 Readers will 
notice that I do not include in this list the over-representation of African-Americans 
and people of colour in the correctional population—a feature of American penality 
that is of great moral and political significance and that many regard as a defining 
characteristic of the system (Alexander 2010; Cole 1999; Loury 2008). I choose to 
omit this because it seems to me that this characteristic is neither distinctive to the US 
5 According to the American Bar Association’s National Inventory, there are 44,500 statutes in the US 
that impose collateral consequences.
6 An absence of reliable data prevents us from knowing whether the US was an outlier in these respects 
over the long term. I believe we should be skeptical of the standard claim that, before 1975, US incarcer-
ation rates used to be close to the Western European norm, running at about 160 per 100,000, since that 
number excludes the jail population and neglects to mention that for much of the 20th century Southern 
states used modes of punishment—convict leasing, chain gangs, and prison farms—that were not 
 enumerated as imprisonment.
7 There are other contrasts that go in the same direction. American prison regimes appear to be harsher 
than elsewhere in the developed world, with high levels of violence and frequent resort to force and iso-
lation (Whitman 2003). Rehabilitation, education, and treatment seem to be more available in other 
nations than in the US (Subramanian & Shames 2013). And the emerging practice of imposing adminis-
trative costs and ‘pay-to-stay’ charges on offenders and their families is more extensive in the US than 
elsewhere (Gottschalk 2015). That American police kill civilians at a much higher rate than occurs else-
where in the liberal democratic world is another mark of America’s distinctive form of criminal justice 
(Karabel 2015). 
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nor exceptional in its extent. Other nations also exhibit massive ethnic and racial 
 disparities in punishment. In Australia, for example, Aboriginal people are 2.5 per 
cent of the general population and 27 per cent of prison inmates.8 Similarly, there is 
evidence that the incarceration rates for ethnic minorities in Canada9 and in England 
and Wales10, exceed that of the US.11 Moreover, the meaning of ‘over-representation’ 
in this context deserves more careful consideration since the most appropriate 
 denominator is not the number of people in the general population—the figure 
 conventionally used—but rather the number of offenders in each demographic group 
(Pease 1994). 
AMERICAN PENALITY AS A HISTORICAL INDIVIDUAL
There is, then, good reason to believe that the US currently deploys a quite distinctive 
apparatus of comparatively severe punishments; a penality that is, as compared to 
other nations, an outlier on several important dimensions. How might we explain 
these characteristics?
One preliminary problem for this inquiry is that there is no such thing as ‘America’ 
when it comes to the deployment of penal power (Garland 2010; Zimring 2017). 
Criminal punishments are separately imposed by the fifty states, the federal 
 government, and by thousands of local jurisdictions—and there is great variation 
across these different entities.
So how can one analyse the overall pattern? How can we talk sensibly about 
American penality while acknowledging its internally differentiated character? 
I suggest we deal with this issue by conceptualising contemporary American 
 punishment as a ‘historical individual’ in the sense that Max Weber gave to the term. 
Weber defines a historical individual—modern capitalism, for example—as ‘a  complex 
of elements associated in historical reality which we unite into a conceptual whole 
from the standpoint of their cultural significance’ (Weber 2002; 2011). Adopting 
Weber’s approach allows us to talk about American penality as a single, culturally 
meaningful complex, thereby uniting for analytical purposes an entity that we 
acknowledge to be legally and geographically differentiated. In contemporary culture 
and politics, America’s penal system has become a meaningful topic of discussion and 
8 http://copylinemagazine.com/2015/01/28/race-justice-news-racial-disparities-in-uk-and-australian-prisons- 
exceeds-those-in-u-s/
9 http://www.sentencingproject.org/news/race-justice-news-native-americans-in-the-justice-system/
10 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/oct/11/black-prison-population-increase-england
11 France does not permit ethnic or racial classification of prison inmates, but ethnographers report a 
massive over-representation in prison of migrants and citizens of North African descent (Fassin 2016).
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debate—its existence as a significant cultural object—and it falls to social scientists to 
analyse that object and explain its conditions of existence.   
Having invoked the spirit of Max Weber, I want also to recall some of the 
 methodological lessons that he taught: lessons that are especially pertinent to our 
topic but are often forgotten by commentators.
First: Distinguish originating causes from subsequent functioning. Explanations 
of historical emergence are not the same as explanations of contemporary reproduc-
tion. The meaning and effects of any practice or institution tend to change over time, 
so we should resist the temptation to project today’s understandings back onto the 
past. That mass incarceration has come to operate as a mode of racial stratification 
(Western 2006; Alexander 2010) or of governing neoliberal insecurity (Wacquant 
2009a) does not mean that it was developed with these purposes in mind. 
Policy changes regularly generate consequences that were not originally antici-
pated. If  we want to assert, for example, that the racial disparities associated with the 
War on Drugs were anticipated and intended by the architects of that policy, we will 
need to adduce the relevant historical evidence—one cannot simply point to the effects 
and infer the intention. 
We should also observe what happens when unanticipated consequences do 
become apparent. Consequences that are unintended at Time 1 may become apparent 
at Time 2; at which point a choice to continue the practice is, in effect, a choice to 
embrace these consequences. So if  an inquiry into the emergence of mass incarcera-
tion produces a story of adverse unintended consequences, we should proceed to ask 
‘why was this phenomenon tolerated once these unintended effects became 
apparent?’
Second: Avoid retrospective projection. There was no plan to build mass incarcer-
ation; no campaign to mount a decades-long march through the state and federal 
legislatures.12  Multiple, diverse processes, dispersed in time and space, produced the 
differentiated assemblage of penal practices and institutions that currently exists. The 
supposed unity and coherence of ‘mass incarceration’ is largely a function of having 
given it a collective name and viewing it as a single problem. 
Third: Specify mechanisms! A full explanation must describe how empirically 
identifiable actors and actions gave rise to causal processes and produced patterned 
outcomes. If  our claim is that a particular level of inequality, or welfare state regime, 
or variety of capitalism gives rise to a specific set of criminal justice outcomes, we have 
to capture that process at the level of individual action and organisational process.
12 It is true that there were frequent campaigns to persuade state legislatures across the nation to adopt 
specific policies—e.g. victim rights, or Three Strikes laws—and organisations such as the American 
Legislative Exchange Counsel played a key role in this. My point is that there was no overall campaign 
linking all the reforms of the thirty-year, nationwide, transformation that produced the present. 
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Fourth: Interpretive accounts must be adequate to the level of meaning. Analyses 
of penal change or of penal functioning should provide an account of the meanings 
that key actors attached to their actions, bearing in mind that the same event or under-
taking may have different meanings to the various actors involved. An analysis that 
claims that mass incarceration is a functional mode of governing neoliberal insecurity 
(Wacquant 2009), or of recreating racial subordination (Alexander 2010), must show 
the forms of meaningful action that produce these outcomes and should account for 
any discrepancy between what was meant, what was done, and what outcomes 
eventuated. 
Fifth: Distinguish functional uses from dysfunctional effects. An institution that is 
useful for some groups may be damaging for others; and practices producing net 
 benefits in the short term may produce net costs at a later point (cf. Merton 1996). 
Functional explanations of mass incarceration (e.g. Wacquant 2009a) should specify 
how that institution does and does not serve the interests of definite social groups over 
specified time periods and provide supporting evidence for these claims.
Sixth: Adopt a dispassionate, value-neutral approach. The question of  punishment 
is highly salient in American politics today and its value-laden character makes it all 
the more difficult to avoid biased premises and partisan interpretations. Committed 
scholarship that deals with politically charged subjects may be inclined to overlook 
inconvenient facts or draw back from unwelcome conclusions, thereby failing to reflect 
the moral and political complexity of the phenomenon in question.  
With these considerations in mind, we can embark on our analysis, beginning with 
a descriptive account and then proceeding to explanation. 
THE NEW IMPERATIVE: PENAL CONTROL
In setting out our descriptive account, a strategic place to start is with a focus on 
 differences and commonalities. As I noted above, American penality is a complex 
assemblage of laws, policies, and practices that has emerged, piecemeal, over the last 
forty years. Far from being the realisation of some national plan, it is the cumulative 
result of multiple contributing causes; operating at the local, state, and federal levels; 
prompted by different events and considerations; involving diverse political actors 
and coalitions; and enacted in thousands of laws, policies, and enforcement practic-
es.13 But despite this multiplicity and variation, it is a remarkable fact that for forty 
consecutive years, all fifty states and the federal government have moved more or less 
13 I draw here on the ‘new generation’ sociological scholarship that focuses on state-level penal history 
and emphasises this variation and contingency: for an excellent overview, see Campbell & Schoenfeld 
(2013).
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continuously in the same expansionist direction (Zimring 2010; Wagner 2014). And, 
even more remarkably, I would suggest, there is a common thread that runs through-
out this vast range of historical moments, political contexts, and penal laws—a 
 fundamental principle that links together these diverse reforms and provides an oper-
ational logic that underpins the whole penal apparatus in its day-to-day routines. This 
common principle is not something vague and generic such as ‘law and order’, ‘harsh 
justice’, or ‘tough on crime’ but instead a specific form of penal power that I will call 
‘penal control.’
Criminal punishment comes in several distinct forms, as the ideal type classifica-
tion set out in Table 1 illustrates.14 Penal afflictions, penal levies, penal controls, and 
penal assistance are distinct forms of punishment, each of them commonly found in 
penal history and still in widespread use today.15 What is striking is that, in recent 
decades, American criminal justice has come to rely overwhelmingly on only one of 
them—punishment as penal control—in contrast to the contemporary penal systems 
of other Western nations where penal levies and penal assistance are much more 
prominent.
Table 1: Forms of punishment.
Penal Afflictions  Capital punishments; corporal punishments; maiming; public shaming;  
stigmatising, etc.
Penal Levies  Fines; deductions; prelevements; restitution; compensation; damages; forfeiture; 
community service; public works, etc.
Penal Controls  Imprisonment; confinement; supervision; exclusion; banishment; incapacitation; 
disqualification, etc.
Penal Assistance  Correctional treatment; restorative work; mediation; drug therapy; remedial 
education; counselling; job training, etc.
Penal control is, I believe, the fundamental principle and basic imperative that 
runs throughout this whole historical period and across this vast institutional land-
scape. (The degrading, cheap-and-mean aspects of American penal institutions—as 
described by Whitman (2003) or Lynch (2009)—are, I believe, a secondary charac-
teristic: the result of an under-funded penal state tasked by a tax-averse, anti- 
government electorate with imposing control on the cheap.) If  we review the list of 
distinctive features I set out above, no fewer than five of them describe how American 
14 Specific penal sanctions may combine one or more of these modal characteristics: e.g. a criminal record 
or a branding can function as an afflictive stigma as well as an incapacitating control; a probation or 
custodial order may provide assistance as well as control, and so on. 
15 Afflictive forms of punishment have declined in the modern Western world, though they were a core 
feature of pre-modern punishment and are still common in many parts of the world (Geltner 2014; 
Garland 2010). 
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criminal justice imposes more extensive forms of control (extreme penalties, frequency 
and length of prison confinement, frequency and length of correctional supervision, 
extent and duration of collateral consequences, etc) while the sixth concerns America’s 
reluctance to use monetary penalties—penal levies that, whatever their other 
 advantages, and however much they are utilised elsewhere, impose little in the way of 
penal control.16
The leading characteristic of the American penal landscape today is not harshness 
(Whitman 2003), or racism (Alexander 2010), or neoliberalism (Wacquant 2009a). Its 
basic imperative is the imposition of penal control—an imperative that is now embod-
ied in penal codes, in the culture of enforcement, and in the legal provisions (such as 
mandatory penalties and ‘truth-in-sentencing’ legislation) that limit the discretion of 
penal actors and oblige them to impose effective and long-lasting penal controls on 
criminal offenders.17 And if  we focus on this fundamental principle we will be able to 
glimpse some important affinities (another Weberian concept) that link America’s dis-
tinctive penality with two distinctive features of the American state and American 
society—a set of linkages that will, in turn, point us to the underlying causal processes 
driving the recent development of American penality. 
The first of these features is the weakness of social organisation, social  integration, 
and informal social control that affects so many of America’s cities and above all its 
poorest communities of colour.18 These structural weaknesses—I will term them 
‘social deficits’—have been produced over time by the operation of relatively 
 untrammelled market forces; overlaid by the continuing legacies of racial division, 
disadvantage, and segregation (Kerner Commission 1968/2016; Krivo et al. 2009; Omi 
& Winant 2014); and reproduced by economic and social disinvestment—much of 
16 The death penalty is typically enacted and imposed in America today as an expressive, retributive 
 gesture and a symbol of tough-on-crime politics (Garland 2010). But it delivers the ultimate form of 
penal control—even when, as is usually the case, death sentences are commuted to sentences of life 
imprisonment without parole. Collateral consequences are mostly forms of exclusion, restriction, and 
incapacitation. Disenfranchisement is an important exception, but it dates from an earlier time and the 
current trend is for these political disabilities to be repealed. Welfare benefit ineligibilities are a mixed 
case: exclusion from public housing is framed as public safety for other residents, but there are elements 
of cost-saving punishment and deterrence here too. The fact that these collateral consequences are not 
well publicised—they are sometimes described as ‘invisible punishments’ (Travis 2002)—suggests that 
deterrence is not their main aim.
17 Public suspicion and distrust extend beyond offenders to include the soft-on-crime officials who might 
turn them loose or fail to lock them up. As I note below, the sentencing revolution was as much about 
controlling judges and parole boards as it was about controlling criminals.  
18 Social deficits in the US are by no means restricted to urban communities and minority groups. Most 
people below the poverty line live in rural areas, and there are more poor whites than blacks or Hispanics. 
But many poor blacks live in segregated urban neighbourhoods with high concentrations of poverty and 
disadvantage—a fact that multiplies the detrimental effects of poverty and generates higher levels of 
disorder and disorganisation (Denton & Massey 1998).  
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which was a consequence of government policies (Wilson 2011). Social deficits are the 
result of processes of cultural adaptation, accommodation, and coping that link 
structural circumstances with collective behaviours and give rise, over time, to high 
rates of criminal violence, social problems, and other forms of social dislocation 
(Wilson 1997; 2011; 2012; Sampson 2012; Sharkey 2013). 
These structural conditions are also associated with low levels of trust—which also 
have consequences for crime and punishment. Distrust of others and distrust of govern-
ment are dimensions of America’s low levels of solidarity that have been shown to be 
positively associated with high levels of violence (LaFree 1998; Roth 2012; for compar-
ative evidence on levels of trust and crime rates, see Karstedt & LaFree 2006). And it 
seems likely that America’s emphasis on penal control expresses an underlying distrust 
of others: above all, anyone convicted of a criminal offence and any criminal justice 
professional who might release dangerous offenders rather than protect the public.
The second characteristic associated with the extensive use of penal control is the 
comparatively limited control capacities and dispositions of the American state. The 
American state has long been distinctive in its relative emphasis on market-freedoms 
rather than social protections—an orientation that distinguishes it from comparable 
states elsewhere and has had the effect of limiting its capacity (and its disposition) to 
deal with problems of social disorganisation other than by penal means.19 When 
American state actors—at federal, state, or local level—decide to address a specific 
social problem (such as drug abuse, criminal violence, homelessness, or mental illness) 
they have fewer positive, effective means at their disposal than do nations with more 
developed and more extensive social states.20 The result is that American criminal 
 justice is frequently charged with tasks—such as care and control of the mentally ill, 
the drug addicted, and the homeless—that other nations allocate to social service 
agencies. And on those occasions where non-penal approaches have been tried—e.g. 
public health approaches to drug abuse in New York in the early 1960s or social 
 welfare approaches to crime control during the federal ‘war on poverty’—these 
 initiatives have foundered for lack of experience, support, and resources (Fortner 
2015; Kohler-Hausmann 2015; Hinton 2016). Before long, these more positive efforts 
were judged to have been ill-conceived failures and political opinion quickly reverted 
to the default of a penal approach. 
19 America’s welfare state regime can be classified as a market-protecting liberal regime and is thus 
grouped together with other liberal regimes such as those of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. But 
within that classification, the US is, on most measures, at the extreme end of the distribution. On the 
distinctive characteristics of the US state and its penal power, see Garland (2010; 2013).
20 This is not to deny that there is a plethora of local programmes and initiatives in most American 
 jurisdictions. The point is that the comparative weakness of the American welfare state’s social provision 
for lower income groups ensures government exerts less positive, pro-social influence over individuals, 
families, and communities.
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Sentencing reform and the build-up of penal control 
If  we review the historical processes that produced today’s penal apparatus, we observe 
control issues continually taking prominence and shaping the direction of penal 
change.21 Of course the historical record is by no means univocal, and there is con-
siderable disagreement about why American punishments became so much more 
severe after 1975. But there is very little disagreement about how this happened, or 
about the proximate causes that brought the current system into existence (Garland 
2013). These proximate causes were: (i) changes in sentencing law and practice; 
(ii) changes in back-end ‘resentencing’—i.e. parole, remission, and pardons; and 
(iii) changes in prosecution practice (Tonry 2016; Pfaff  2017). 
The following pages describe how these legal changes emerged and how, over time 
and in a variety of ways, they expressed an overweening concern with public safety 
and a singular commitment to penal control as the appropriate response. 
PHASE 1: SENTENCING REFORM
The long-term upwards movement of America’s prison and jail populations began in 
the 1970s with a Sentencing Reform movement that, in retrospect, can be seen as the 
first phase in a thirty-year, multi-phase sentencing law revolution. Prior to 1975, most 
states (and the federal system) adopted an ‘indeterminate sentencing’ model, the chief 
aim of which was to individualise the treatment of offenders, rehabilitating where 
possible and incapacitating where necessary (Reitz 2012). The sentence imposed by 
the court was a provisional, indeterminate one stipulating an open-ended term of 
custody (e.g. ‘one year to life’) to be served in a state penitentiary (or a ‘correctional 
institution’ as prisons came to be known). A parole board would later recalibrate the 
court’s sentence in light of the offender’s risk profile and response to treatment—with 
the consequence that most offenders were released early after serving only a fraction 
of their sentences. ‘Good time’ laws allowed additional reductions as rewards for 
 compliant behavior (Jacobs 1992).
These arrangements eventually attracted widespread criticism. Indeterminate 
 sentencing robbed punishments of certainty and reduced their deterrent value; 
 dis cretionary release opened the way to arbitrariness; and ‘individuation’ was a recipe 
21 That increased penal control is the recurring outcome of so many different political processes in so 
many different settings strongly suggests that it is a functional response to a generalised problem. For the 
classic version of this argument, see Karl Polanyi’s account of the re-assertion of social protections in the 
laissez-faire era (Polanyi 1944).
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for unfairness and inequality. When research suggested that correctional treatment 
did little to reduce recidivism, the writing was on the wall (Garland 2001; 2016).  
The sentencing law reforms passed between 1975 and 1984 were a reaction to these 
problems. Their chief  aim was to establish standards that would constrain discretion, 
minimise disparities, and subject sentencing powers to legal regulation. The new ideal 
was the ‘determinate’ sentences, proportionate to the offence, not tailored to the 
offender. Many states (and the federal government) abolished parole, enacted 
 sentencing guidelines, and established sentencing commissions to oversee their new 
systems. 
The legislative activity of the 1970s and early 1980s transformed the politics of 
sentencing. Instead of being administered by experts behind the scenes, questions of 
sentencing now became political questions, discussed in newspaper editorials and 
debated on the floors of legislative chambers. To the on-looking public, the revelation 
that most felons were released much earlier than the sentence length imposed by the 
court appeared less as a sensible way of motivating rehabilitation and more as a 
 scandalous leniency. In a political climate increasingly dominated by ‘law and order’, 
the liberal aims that initiated the reform movement gave way to more conservative 
goals. Tough-on-crime conservatives joined liberals in demanding an end to sentenc-
ing discretion, not because they worried about discrimination but because they 
 distrusted criminal justice personnel and wanted to prevent them jeopardising public 
safety by releasing dangerous felons. The legislative drive, from this point onwards, 
was not to enhance sentencing equity but instead to mandate penalties that would 
protect the public. Such was the political concern to guarantee effective penal control 
that it soon overcame the judicial opposition to mandatory sentencing and eventually 
dissolved the discretionary powers of penal officials.    
American sentencing turned on its axis. By the 1960s, indeterminate sentencing 
had been more firmly established in the US than anywhere else (Pifferi 2016) and 
American courts imposed very lengthy sentences that were altogether unknown in 
other nations—the idea being to make a deterrent show of harshness, safe in the 
knowledge that the court’s sentence would later be reduced by parole and good time. 
Thirty years later, very lengthy sentences were still being imposed, but now they meant 
what they said. As Tonry (2016) observes, the old practice of announcing high—but 
effectively meaningless—maximum sentences helps explain why US prison terms are 
now so much longer than those imposed elsewhere. 
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PHASE 2: THE WAR ON DRUGS
The impact of the ‘War on Drugs’ is one of the most discussed and least understood 
issues in current debates about the build-up of American penality. The phrase itself  
(which dates from remarks by President Nixon in the early 1970s—see Hinton (2016)) 
refers to the nationwide movement to criminalise the possession and sale of banned 
substances, imposing harsh, often mandatory, penalties—such as New York State’s 
Rockefeller Drug Law of 1973 or the federal Anti-Drug Abuse laws of 1984, 1986, 
and 1988—backed up by vigorous enforcement at the local level. 
Many commentators regard this wave of legislation as the primary cause of mass 
incarceration and its racial consequences, pointing to the fact that a majority of 
 federal prisoners are serving time for drug offences, and to the marked racial dispari-
ties that characterise drug law enforcement (Alexander 2010; Hinton 2016). But while 
critics are right to deplore the drug war’s harsh racial effects it is important to observe 
that the policy aims originally motivating these efforts were rather more complex and, 
for my purposes, rather more revealing.    
The Rockefeller Drug Laws, to take an important example, emerged following a 
series of failed efforts to deal with the crime and disorder generated by widespread 
heroin use in neighbourhoods like Harlem in New York City (Fortner 2015; Kohler-
Hausmann 2015). In response to community demands for action to alleviate these 
problems, New York authorities initially put in place a public health, penal–welfare 
approach, providing non-penal treatment to addicts and reserving criminal penalties 
for ‘pushers’. When these efforts—which were under-resourced and poorly imple-
mented—did little to reduce the problem, Governor Nelson Rockefeller shifted to a 
markedly penal approach, enacting harsh mandatory penalties for possession as well 
as for sale. Rockefeller’s decision was no doubt a political one, shaped by his presiden-
tial ambitions and his wish to be seen as a ‘law and order’ conservative. But it is 
 striking that his tough approach attracted vocal support from African-American 
community leaders (Fortner 2015)—just as the Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of the 
mid-1980s would garner strong support from the Congressional Black Caucus 
(Forman f.c.). Whatever its subsequent history, the War on Drugs was initially viewed 
by some of its proponents as a necessary, good faith effort to relieve poor urban 
 communities of the blight of street drugs and the neighbourhood crime and violence 
associated with them.22 
22 Miller (2016) and Forman (f.c.) point out that community activists generally called for an ‘all of the 
above’ approach to the drug problems in their neighbourhoods—favouring social and public health rem-
edies as well as law enforcement ones. But when the former failed to materialise, or to appear effective, 
many lent their support to increased policing and penal control.
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As a crime-control tactic, this focus on drug offences offered several advantages. 
To prosecute crimes of violence, the authorities must typically rely on the willingness 
of witnesses to come forward and a showing of criminal intent on the part of the 
accused—both of which can be hard to obtain. The laws prohibiting drug possession 
and sale created offences that were easier to prove and that could be proactively 
enforced by police stops and ‘buy and bust’ methods.23 They thereby provided a new 
and potentially more effective means of apprehending and convicting violent  offenders, 
gang leaders, organised criminals, and ‘drug czars’—and their penalty scales were 
calibrated accordingly. This was why, for at least some of its supporters—above all for 
prosecutors and police—the War on Drugs was a proxy war, a set of crime-control 
measures directed not at recreational drug users but at violent criminals (Stuntz 2013; 
Lynch 2016).    
An additional motivation—perhaps the most significant one in the long term—
derived from the fact that a focus on drug control provided the federal government 
with a plausible basis for becoming more directly involved in crime control at a time 
when crime was becoming a problem of urgent concern to large numbers of voters. 
Historically, American criminal justice had been a matter for state and local govern-
ment and the US Constitution placed strict limits on the extent to which federal 
authorities could involve themselves in the business of crime-control. But with crime 
growing in political salience, national politicians looked for ways to involve them-
selves more actively and thereby reap some of the political rewards of responding to 
public concerns (Gottschalk 2006; Stuntz 2013, Hinton 2016). This involvement 
 initially took the form of establishing federal agencies such as the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Agency to coordinate or fund local law enforcement. But the criminalisa-
tion of drugs opened up a new and more direct form of federal involvement since 
illegal drugs could be deemed a form of ‘interstate commerce’—a domain over which 
the federal government did have jurisdiction. Waging a war on drugs was, for the 
 federal government, a means of circumventing constitutional limitations, expanding 
its law enforcement apparatus (Hinton 2016), and engaging the politics of law and 
order at the national level. 
From the 1980s on, Congress passed anti-drug abuse laws and federal prosecutors, 
federal courts, and federal penitentiaries began to enforce them with increasing vigour. 
But ultimately the War on Drugs would mostly be fought by local police and county 
prosecutors, so federal authorities also took steps to incentivise action at this level, 
providing generous subsidies for local drug-law enforcement and enacting forfeiture 
statutes that allowed local law enforcement to retain the proceeds of drug crime 
23 See Dubber (2005) on possession offences as a means of relaxing evidentiary burdens for the 
prosecution.
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 investigations.24 Over time, these incentives would produce a massive enforcement 
over-reach. A drug war supposedly aimed at serious violent offenders would  eventually 
sweep up masses of petty offenders and low-level street dealers and sentence them to 
prison terms that bore little relation to their culpability or to any threat they might 
pose to the public (Tonry 2016; Hinton 2016; Lynch 2016).  
PHASE 3: THE WAR ON CRIME
The most notorious phase of recent sentencing history is the ‘law and order’ period 
that ran from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, with the US Congress encouraging, 
subsidising, and emulating the states in the pursuit of ‘tough on crime’ policies 
(Garland 2001). These policies aimed to ensure public safety, express public anger, 
and satisfy victims by increasing the certainty and severity of penalties. The lesson of 
Willie Horton in the 1988 presidential race (Anderson 1995) had been well learned: 
henceforth there were to be no dangerous offenders let loose on the public and no 
politicians seen as soft on crime. 
To secure these goals, legislators took near-total charge of punishment, stipulating 
in advance the precise penalty to be imposed; depriving judges, parole boards, and 
prison officials of sentencing discretion; and empowering hard-charging prosecutors 
who could be relied upon to be aggressive in locking-up ‘bad guys’ (Lynch 2016). In a 
flurry of legislative activity, states across the nation passed mandatory minimum 
 sentences (targeting drug offences, sex crime, and gun crime); Three-Strikes laws 
(which could send third-time felons to prison for life); Truth-in-Sentencing laws 
(which gave the states federal subsidies for prisons in return for guarantees that state 
prisoners would not be given early release); and Life Without Parole sentences (Tonry 
2016). Tight legal controls were thus imposed upon sentencers and penal officials who 
were mandated to impose extensive penal controls on offenders and inmates.
In this context, the working practices of probation and parole offices were 
 transformed, with a new emphasis on risk management, revocation, and the re- 
imprisonment of supervisees who failed to meet the conditions of their licences.25 By 
2000, 34 per cent of all prison admissions resulted from parole revocations rather than 
new crimes. In some states the figure was higher than 50 per cent. Correctional 
24 The 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act permitted local law enforcement to seize as much as 90 
per cent of cash and property from accused drug dealers (Hinton 2016: 312)
25 As Simon (1993) points out in an analysis that connects penal policy with the wider political economy, 
the difficulty of securing employment or housing for ex-felons in the wake of deindustrialisation and 
reduced social support created insurmountable problems for a parole system dedicated to assistance 
and resettlement. 
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 supervision had transformed itself  from a form of social assistance to a mode of 
penal control. 
Meanwhile, prosecutors became the most powerful actors in the system, and many 
used the leverage provided by mandatory sentences and sentence enhancements to 
pile on charges, obtain guilty pleas, and elicit information about other offenders and 
offences (Lynch 2016; Pfaff  2017). In the 1970s, approximately 66 per cent of cases 
resulted in a plea bargain. By the 1990s the figure was more than 95 per cent (Wright 
2012). Without this mass production of guilty pleas—and the effective end of due 
process and trial by jury that it entailed—mass incarceration would not be 
sustainable.   
In this recalibrated system, the cumulative effect of prior convictions took on a 
new meaning. Because a subsequent offence could result in a mandatory prison 
 sentence that was two or three times longer than the sentence for the first offence, 
prior convictions operated as multipliers. And given the number of people who pass 
through the system, and their high rates of recidivism, criminal justice became a 
self-sustaining growth machine. The system also exhibited the sociological law of 
cumulative disadvantage—groups such as young black men who received a dispropor-
tionate level of criminal justice early in their lives would subsequently receive enhanced 
sentences and be disproportionately subject to imprisonment. 
The eventual impact of these laws—which would continue to authorise draconian 
sentences long after crime and violence rates steeply declined26—was to double the 
size of an already swollen prison population and project this population far into the 
future. As for individual offenders, the new sentencing norms meant that vast  numbers 
of people were sentenced to terms of confinement that were measured not in months 
and years but in ‘decades and lifetimes’ (Tonry 2016). 
Instead of adjudicating the blame-worthiness of individuals and punishing them 
accordingly, the new system was designed to sequester and incapacitate masses of 
offenders for lengthy periods of time. Over time, the principle of proportionality 
 disappeared—particularly in respect of drug offences (now punished as severely as 
violent crime) and criminal history enhancements (which increased an offender’s 
 sentence by multiples of two, three, or even four). So did any concern with parsimony 
or the liberty interests of convicted offenders (Tonry 2016). America’s penal system 
became profoundly illiberal and unequal. Convicted offenders came to be seen as too 
risky to circulate in public and altogether undeserving of 8th Amendment protections. 
America’s system of criminal justice became a system of criminal control (Garland 
2001).
26 The post-1990 pattern of crime rate declines coinciding with prison rate increases is often presented as 
evidence that the two are unconnected. Such an interpretation ignores the effect of time lags and stored-up 
consequences. 
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Today, after two decades of declining rates of crime and violence, it is difficult to 
appreciate the climate of opinion that produced draconian measures such as the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994—and politicians associated 
with these laws are now being made to pay a price. But it is important to recall, along 
with all the populism, racism, and opportunism of political officials, that homicide 
levels and public concern about violent crime were, in these years, at an all-time high 
(Enns 2016).27 Even a system as illiberal, unequal, and oppressively racialised as 
American criminal justice was not entirely devoid of genuine public purpose and 
 community-safety motivations as it emerged over time. Over the forty years during 
which American sentencing was caught up in an ongoing revolution, a multiplicity of 
separate projects, plans, and purposes unfolded. In the process, the conservative 
 politics of the war on crime came to displace the liberal politics of sentencing reform 
and to overlay the community politics of public safety, with the result that an 
 imperative of penal control came to dominate the entire system. The criminal justice 
system that exists today is the result of complex interactions rather than the realisa-
tion of an overall plan or a single set of motivations. But, for all this dispersion and 
conflict, an emergent principle has continually been asserted and supported: the 
imperative of penal control. 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CAUSES
These shifts in law, policy, and practice—each of them increasing the extent, the 
 intensity, and the certainty of penal control—were the proximate causes that together 
created the penal system that exists today. But what were the broader forces that 
moved law and policy in this direction and that created a penal system that is much 
more extreme than that in any comparable nation? And why did this diversity of 
causal processes give rise to the monotonous demand for more penal control? This, it 
seems to me, must be a distinctively American story. In the years after 1980, other 
Western nations also experienced increased crime, disruptive social change, economic 
insecurity, and neoliberal politics. Many became more punitive, more restrictive, 
decreasing welfare and increasing prison. But none matched the extent or intensity of 
American penality (Walmsley 2016; Lappi-Seppälä 2008; Tonry 2009). So why has 
the US been more prone to the use of penal control than has any other nation in the 
developed world? In the remainder of this article, I discuss four theories of historical 
change—each of which offers a different causal narrative for understanding American 
27 As Kleiman (2016) observes, in 1994, the nation’s homicide figures topped 23,000 for the fourth year in 
a row, and no one could know that this number was about to decline and to keep on decreasing for the 
next twenty years. Today the annual number of homicides is around 14,000.
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penality and the forces that brought it about.28 Building on these accounts – and 
developing significant points of disagreement—I conclude by sketching an alternative 
framework for the study of American penality.
(i) Mass incarceration as racial subordination
The most provocative and widely read account of contemporary American  punishment 
is The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (2010) by legal 
scholar and civil rights activist Michelle Alexander. Alexander argues that mass 
 incarceration, together with the multiple disqualifications imposed on felons, amounts 
to a new racial caste system that consigns poor black men to a second-class  citizenship, 
barring them from government housing, welfare benefits, and political participation, 
permitting their discriminatory treatment in employment, and ensuring that masses 
of them will cycle in and out of prison. 
According to Alexander, this system emerged in the wake of the civil rights 
 movement as a means of restoring blacks to a subordinate social status similar to the 
one that operated in the Jim Crow South. Because explicit race controls were outlawed 
by civil rights reforms and are expressly prohibited in today’s political culture, the 
New Jim Crow is premised not on race but on a supposedly ‘colour-blind’ criminality. 
But Alexander insists that contemporary law enforcement and, above all, the ‘War on 
Drugs’ are thoroughly racialised, operating in ways that target poor, minority youth 
and ensuring that mass incarceration and its disabilities exclude millions of African 
Americans from participation in American democracy.
The New Jim Crow is a work of real political importance. More than any other 
intervention, it can be credited with putting the problem of mass incarceration on the 
American political agenda, and (together with Black Lives Matter) initiating a  growing 
social movement that now presses for criminal justice reform. And Alexander is clearly 
right to deplore the racial disparities generated by the War on Drugs and accurate in 
describing the overall effect of disfranchisement, disqualification, and discrimination 
as a form of second-class citizenship for former felons, one third of whom are black. 
In light of America’s history, a diminished citizenship status disproportionately 
 occupied by blacks inevitably takes on the appearance of a racial caste system. 
However, as others (Forman 2012) have pointed out, around 40 per cent of prison 
inmates are white, which means that millions of white people are also condemned to 
28 Despite differing emphases, these four accounts overlap at many points, with each pointing to some or 
all of the following: a rightward shift in the American electorate, a backlash against civil rights, rising 
public concern about street crime and disorder, the fusion of crime and race issues forged by the 
Republican Party’s southern strategy, the rise of ‘law-and-order’ politics, and the mobilisation of cross-
party support for tough-on-crime measures.
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this second-class citizenship. Indeed, if  federal and state authorities were to release all 
of their black prison inmates tomorrow, the US would still have the largest prison 
population and rate of incarceration in the world—which means that a racial 
 explanation leaves much of America’s distinctive penality unexplained. American 
criminal justice is undoubtedly racially skewed in its operations and effects but not to 
the extent that Alexander claims, and not primarily for the reasons that she alleges. 
Alexander presents her indictment with the forensic skill of a first-class litigator, 
so it is no surprise that she cites the War on Drugs as her leading example of racialised 
punishment. As many commentators have observed, survey evidence suggests that 
blacks and whites consume (and perhaps sell) illicit drugs at about the same rates, but 
law enforcement focuses much more on blacks; and people of colour are dispropor-
tionately imprisoned for drug offences. Little wonder then, that the War on Drugs is 
Exhibit A in Alexander’s critique. 
But the problem with this analysis is that the unequal racial justice that occurs in 
respect of drugs is not so evident in regard to other offences. When it comes to violent 
crime, for example, blacks (that is to say poor black males) have a disproportionately 
high level of involvement in offending—and their rates of punishment are not signifi-
cantly different from their rates of crime (FBI 2013; Western 2006). And this matters, 
because most prisoners in America’s prisons are serving time not for drug offences but 
for violent crimes.29 
Nor was the War on Drugs unrelated to the problem of criminal violence. Recall 
that in the 1970s and 1980s, communities of colour and their political representatives 
were deeply concerned about drug-related crime and violence in their neighbour-
hoods, which is why they called for tough punishments and supported legislation such 
as the Rockefeller Drug laws of 1973 and the Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 
and 1988 (Fortner 2015; Forman 2012). As we have seen, the War on Drugs was, at 
least in part, a ‘proxy war’ strategy for apprehending and convicting violent offenders 
by other means. Its origins—and much of its original support—lay not in an attempt 
to suppress recreational drug use but in an effort to address the associated problem of 
violent street crime. Even the notoriously ‘racist’ sentencing disparity between crack 
cocaine possession and powder cocaine possession can be understood (though not 
justified) in these terms. ‘Crack’ is cocaine packaged for the poor. And when it took 
hold in poor communities it generated an enormous amount of street crime and vio-
lence. In contrast, the consumption of powder cocaine by Wall Street reprobates and 
affluent drug users generated very little visible violent crime. Crack was more severely 
29 52 per cent of state prisoners are currently incarcerated for crimes of violence. Only in the federal 
prison system—which houses about 10 per cent of American prisoners—do drug offenders form a 
majority of those incarcerated (BJS 2013).
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punished not because it was associated with blacks but because—rightly or wrongly—
it was perceived to be associated with waves of crime and violence. 
Contra The New Jim Crow, the creation of a racial caste can best be understood 
not as deliberate policy of racial subordination but instead as the unintended but 
foreseeable result of overreaching law enforcement operating in a class- and racially -
stratified environment—a result that was long tolerated because there were no 
 organised political forces advocating for poor black men (Stuntz 2001) and, it must be 
said, because the lives of these individuals are not highly valued by policymakers, 
politicians, and the American public. It was the established hierarchies of race and 
class—together with the differential levels of violence and worklessness that these 
hierarchies fostered—that ensured that penal power concentrated its effects on poor 
communities of colour: a story of class overlaid by race, not of race alone. The fact 
that, in contrast to black high-school dropouts, college-educated blacks are less likely 
to be imprisoned today than they were in the 1970s (Western 2006) provides further 
support for this interpretation.
The fact that the racial and class effects of penal policy have been tolerated and 
reproduced long after they came to light tells us a great deal about America’s power 
structure and the value placed on the lives and liberties of poor black people. Penal 
controls are always imposed by one group on another, and in 1990s America, the 
crime fears of suburbanites and the white middle class counted for much more than 
the lives of young black men and the welfare of their families and communities. Only 
with the emergence of Black Lives Matter in 2013 has this situation been publicly 
contested in an organised way.  
A final point: segregated areas of concentrated poverty were the worst affected by 
drugs, crime, and violence—meaning that they were the locus of victimisation and 
calls for action but also that they were communities where many violent offenders 
lived and which attracted tough enforcement, stop and frisk, buy and bust, etc. This, 
in turn, produced a disproportionate number of black arrestees and convicted, 
 imprisoned offenders. These racial disparities thus made their way into criminal  justice 
(where they were subsequently amplified by the multiplier effects of ‘prior convic-
tions’) because of concerns about crime and its control, not by dint of racism as such. 
And this is important politically as well as analytically, since it points to the need to 
address the structural racism of economic and social organisation rather than assume 
that the problem is primarily one of discrimination by police and penal officials. 
Established hierarchies, social divisions, power structures, and biases will shape how 
any social policy is implemented—even when the policy is colour-blind, race-neutral, 
or race-sensitive. But the racial disparities that are produced by law enforcement and 
criminal justice are not the foundation of the problem. These processes build on and 
amplify racially disparate patterns of criminal involvement and criminal  vulnerability—
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disparate patterns that are a product of structures of economic and social exclusion 
and of intergenerational transmission of cumulative disadvantage.
(ii) American penality as neoliberal governance
Sociologist Loïc Wacquant argues a different but equally provocative thesis in his 
book, Punishing the Poor: the Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (2009a).30 
Wacquant’s thesis is that America’s expanded penal system is a means of reinforcing 
America’s increasingly precarious labour market and controlling the disruptive social 
fallout of the austerity and insecurity now faced by working people and, above all, by 
poor, unskilled, black males. 
According to Wacquant, prison growth is an unspoken but strategically integral 
element of the neoliberal policies that have dominated US politics since the late 1970s. 
On this account, America’s prison system expanded to contain a surplus population 
thrown out of work by deindustrialisation and deprived of social support by the roll-
back of the Keynesian welfare state. In this socioeconomic context, the threat of 
imprisonment operates—alongside scaled-back and increasingly conditional welfare 
benefits—as a means of pressurising individuals to accept low-wage work. Like the 
Poor Law and the workhouse before it, today’s system of imprisonment operates as a 
‘less eligible’ adjunct to the labour market. Its message is: accept the terms of employ-
ment or become subject to welfare discipline and penal control (see also Soss et al. 
2011). Wacquant argues that the build-up of the penal system is an integral part of 
neoliberal strategy and not a pragmatic response to crime rates or criminal victimisa-
tion. There is, he insists, a ‘crime–incarceration disconnect’ (Wacquant 2009b: 144). 
According to Wacquant, ‘the level of incarceration in a given society bears no relation 
to its crime rate’ (2009b: 158)—and any attempt to link the two is mere ideology.31 
Wacquant is right to insist that labour-market insecurity, intensified by  segregation 
and concentrated poverty, provides a structural context that helps explain the massive 
imprisonment of poor, black, working-age males. (These same structures also deter-
mine the educational careers, health outcomes, family formation, alcohol and drug 
use, and rates of violence of the groups in question.) And he is right to insist that 
neoliberal economic and social policies, including the ‘welfare reforms’ of the 1990s, 
have served to reinforce rather than alleviate these effects. But on closer inspection, it 
seems clear that America’s welfare state has changed rather less than Wacquant claims: 
as Shannon (2013) points out, working-age, able-bodied males never had a ‘social 
30 See also, Prisons of Poverty (Wacquant 2009b) which contains many of the same arguments.
31 ‘… the discourses that seek to connect crime and punishment in America have no validity other than 
ideological’ (Wacquant 2009b: 159).
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right to assistance’ and it is women and children, not young men, who have felt the 
main impact of the 1996 Act. 
Similarly, Wacquant’s claim that prison expansion was a neoliberal strategy, 
intended to pre-empt the disruption that its economic policies would bring in its wake, 
remains an unsupported—and ultimately implausible—assertion for which he  supplies 
no persuasive evidence. Although one might claim that mass incarceration has come 
to operate as a functional support for neoliberal policies by warehousing a surplus 
labour population and penalising illegal alternatives to low-waged work, there is no 
evidence that any neoliberal thinker ever strategised in this way or proposed any such 
policy of punishment.32 And given that neoliberals generally oppose the build-up of 
the state apparatus and state power, and might be expected to propose less expensive 
means of propping up their labour-market regime, Wacquant’s explanation looks like 
the kind of post-hoc functionalism that Weber warned against.33 A more likely 
 explanation is that the problem of crime—itself  structured by free-market inequalities 
and social neglect—gave rise to popular demands for tougher punishment which, in 
turn, disproportionately affected the dispossessed and illegally employed inner-city 
black males. The association between neoliberalism and increased punishment is 
 better viewed as an emergent outcome, not a precipitating cause or intention. And 
rather than see the build-up of penal controls as a pre-emptive strategy in anticipation 
of the ‘social fallout’ that neoliberalism might produce, it seems more likely that these 
controls were developed in response to the high-crime environment and public safety 
concerns that characterised the 1980s and 1990s (Garland 2001). 
Wacquant is also fundamentally mistaken when he insists that there is a ‘discon-
nect’ between crime rates and punishment rates—a position that he argues most 
expressly and emphatically but which is also embraced by writers such as Tonry 
(2009), Alexander (2010), Mauer (2006), and Hinton (2016) who say much the same 
thing. Support for this ‘disconnect’ thesis is summoned up by pointing out that pun-
ishment and crime did not change in lockstep; that American imprisonment rates 
continued to increase during the 1990s even as crime rates fell; and that many other 
countries experienced crime rate rises but none of them reacted by creating mass 
incarceration; ergo, they say, there is no causal connection.34 But these arguments are 
32 The explicitly neoliberal critique of mass incarceration and excessive correctional expenditure by the 
group ‘Right on Crime’ tends to support the view that a massive and increasingly expensive penal state 
was no part of any neoliberal agenda (Gottschalk 2014). 
33 The mistake is to assume that right-wing parties and their signature policies are ‘neoliberal’ when in fact 
these parties are coalitions and their policies are an eclectic, contradictory mix. See Garland (2001) on 
the coalitions between neoliberals and neoconservatives with roots in the Republican Party in the US and 
in Britain’s Conservative Party, and the importance of that distinction for understanding penal policy.
34 For an alternative view, see Western (2016), who argues that crime rates and penal rates are not unre-
lated though they do not change together in lockstep. ‘Punishment is not determined by crime, but crime
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largely specious. Policy effects typically take a considerable time to occur, since 
 processes of problem definition, political mobilisation, legislative enactment, and 
implementation often unfold over years or decades, creating a temporal gap between 
the problem and the response. American property crime rose steeply from the 1960s to 
the 1980s, as did violence and homicide, which did not peak until the early 1990s. 
Throughout that period and beyond, the American public came to regard crime as 
one of the most serious problems facing the nation, and political representatives 
scrambled to put new laws and policy responses in place (Garland 2001; Flamm 2005; 
Enns 2016). That rising imprisonment rates lagged behind rising crime rates and 
 continued to increase even as crime rates showed a sustained decline is evidence of 
these temporal processes (and of the stored-up consequences I described above) not 
proof of a ‘crime–incarceration disconnect’.
The relationship between crime rates and penal policies is an empirical issue that 
will vary across time and space, but our approach to this empirical question will be 
shaped by theoretical assumptions. A founding principle of the sociology of punish-
ment (Garland 1990) is that penal phenomena are not to be understood as a simple 
reaction or response to crime, but instead have their own dynamics and determina-
tions. Punishment is a social institution not an automatic reaction or a mechanical 
response. But to assert this principle is not to assert that penal policies are unrelated 
to crime rates, crime perceptions, crime fears, and theories of crime causation and 
crime control. Crime affects punishment insofar as it produces a volume effect 
(changes in the number of case processed) or a policy effect (changes in penal tactics 
or strategy intended to respond to perceived crime problems). When the latter effect 
occurs, it generally does so slowly and in a mediated fashion. Real or perceived changes 
in crime rates or in the nature of crime affect policy to the extent that they generate 
shifts in public or professional opinion that subsequently gain political traction, legal 
enactment, and practical enforcement. The relationship is a complex, mediated one—
but a significant one nevertheless.
As for the comparative claim that other nations experienced crime rate rises with-
out resorting to mass incarceration, we need to bear in mind two facts. One is that, in 
most such nations, imprisonment rates did rise in the wake of crime rate rises, even if  
these increases were modest by comparison with the US (Walmsley 2016; Miller 
2016).35 The second, and more important, is that crime problems in the US are quite 
and violence are ripe with the potential for punishment because they occur in the context of social policy 
failure and poverty.’
35 According to Lappi-Seppälä (2008), differences in prison rates across Western European nations are 
not correlated with differences in crime rates across these nations. I think this finding makes sense: penal 
policy is relatively autonomous of crime rates and nations with similar levels of crime may develop rather 
different penal policies. But it does not follow that penal policy is never driven by crime rates and by
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different from those typically experienced by the nations of Western Europe. As 
Zimring and Hawkins (1997) pointed out years ago, and as Miller (2015, 2016) Roth 
(2017) and Gallo et al. (2017) have recently reminded us, America has extraordinarily 
high rates of homicide and these comparatively high rates increased dramatically 
between the 1960s and the early 1990s. High levels of life-threatening violence change 
how people react to crime. The salience of crime, the fear of crime, and the public 
demand for forceful crime-control are liable to be much greater where the crime mix is 
weighted towards lethal violence and—to remind ourselves of another salient differ-
ence—where guns are routinely present in the background of social life. 
For many communities in the US—and above all for poor, black, urban commu-
nities—crime is not a social nuisance or a quality of life issue: it is an existential 
threat. No other developed nation has homicide levels that are remotely comparable 
to those in the US, even following twenty years of falling US murder rates. 
Consequently, fear of crime in America—where homicide is a leading cause of death 
for young males, and the leading cause for black males aged fifteen to thirty-four—is 
not the equivalent of the crime fears that affect more peaceable societies.
I don’t know why so many serious commentators deny that penal policies are, to 
some degree, shaped by crime levels and by the public perceptions and sentiments that 
form around them. But I suspect the reason is ideological. I suspect they believe that 
explanations that foreground crime and violence, or view penal policy as a policy 
response to crime and violence, are inherently ‘conservative’ and ought to be avoided 
lest they appear to provide a justification for mass incarceration. Better, these 
 commentators assume, to insist that penal policy is purely political, or racial, or 
 neoliberal and to subject it to a political critique, leaving the difficult problems of 
crime and violence out of the discussion. But if  this is the rationale for such a posi-
tion, it is fundamentally misconceived. There is nothing intrinsically conservative 
about pointing to underlying problems of crime and victimisation. Nor does it 
depoliticise penality to insist that, however much politics and ideology shape penal 
laws and their enforcement, at its core penal policy involves some attempt to contain, 
control, and otherwise discourage crime. 
Interpersonal violence is a product of social and economic structures, mediated by 
patterns of social control and cultural adaptation, and enacted in specific social situ-
ations by particular individuals. It is a patterned phenomenon, not a random one, and 
those most prone to violence are disproportionately drawn from highly disadvantaged 
circumstances. To recognise that certain communities exhibit very high rates of 
associated public fears, resentments, and political mobilisations. And where rates of serious crime are on 
an altogether different scale—as is the case with US violence rates—one would expect penal policy also 
to operate at a different level. 
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 violence is not to blame their residents—and certainly not to link race and violence.36 
It is to call attention to a major social problem that is (in the US) disproportionately 
experienced by communities of colour, a problem that is intimately linked to the 
 problem of mass incarceration, and that ought also to be made a priority for remedial 
governmental action. The poor, urban communities of colour that experience the 
most incarceration are the same communities most affected by street crime and 
 criminal violence. Far from disconnecting penal policy from the crime problem we 
need to bracket these together and trace their genesis back to larger structures of 
political economy and state action.37
Alexander and Wacquant may well be right in their account of the functional 
effects of mass incarceration, but neither is correct in their causal accounts of its 
emergence. Racism and neoliberalism should be viewed not as primary motivating 
causes but instead as structural contexts in which both crime problems and penal 
 policies emerge, are given meaning, and produce effects. 
(iii) Crime control as a recipe for governing 
In his book, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American 
Democracy and created a Culture of Fear (2007) socio-legal scholar Jonathan Simon 
offers a third—and more explicitly political—explanation for America’s expansive 
penality. Simon describes how law-and-order politics became an attractive option for 
elected officials, and especially for state governors, in a post-1970s era when economic 
transformations made it much more difficult for elected officials to distribute New 
Deal-style social provision benefits to constituents in return for political support. 
Simon argues that the newfound appeal of a ‘war-on-crime’ and a victim-centred 
 politics prompted vote-seeking politicians to use crime control—and its associated 
rhetoric and techniques—as an all-purpose template for governance in areas as diverse 
as education, housing, workplace relations, and family policy. American penality, on 
this account, is the outcome of a default political strategy of ‘governing through 
36 Black crime typically occurs at elevated rates only where black disadvantage is layered and  concentrated. 
Where these socio-economic effects are removed, offending rates for blacks are no higher than for other 
groups. White rates of crime and violence are also elevated in the US compared to elsewhere, and are also 
concentrated in areas of social and economic deprivation. And of course most crime and violence is 
intra-racial (Sampson & Wilson 2005). 
37 I should stress that poverty and unemployment do not directly cause crime or violence—and anti-social 
behaviours are plentiful among the rich and privileged (Hagan 2010). But concentrated poverty and 
social exclusion undermine the strength of a group’s collective efficacy (Sampson 2012) and lead to 
 failures of socialisation and social control in families, schools, labour markets, and communities—which 
in turn give rise to crime. Socialisation, social control, social integration are all made more difficult by the 
stress of chronically scarce resources. 
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crime’ and Simon’s book documents the extent to which penal control recipes have, 
since the 1980s, become pervasive throughout American society.  
I regard this thesis as largely correct in its descriptive claims but it leaves an 
 important causal question unanswered. Simon is persuasive when he describes crime 
control as a prominent theme in recent state and federal government and he is  similarly 
convincing when he points out that the demise of the New Deal settlement has meant 
that American politicians are now less able to win support by distributing social and 
economic benefits to their constituents (Fraser & Gerstle 1990). But what his analysis 
does not explain is why the decline of the earlier political quid pro quo led to the 
 emergence of the current one. Why this new formula and not some other? 
We need to ask why crime control recipes have become so central to American 
political action and so appealing to American popular audiences. What are the 
 circumstances prompting demands for penal-style controls, not just in criminal justice 
but also in schools, city planning, shopping malls, public housing, and workplaces? 
And why is penal control—rather than other more pro-social interventions—the 
default response of American governments to every symptom of deviance and dis-
order? The answer, it seems to me, must point to the social control deficits that I have 
described above—deficits that grew worse in the period Simon describes, just as other 
pro-social forms of state action came to be politically discredited, retrenched, and 
restricted (Garland 2001; Fraser & Gerstle 1990: Hinton 2016). 
(iv) Social change, social control, and social order
The final narrative I want to discuss is developed in The Culture of Control: Crime and 
Social Order in Contemporary Society (Garland 2001) a study of changing US and 
UK crime-control policies and their social causes. In that book I argue that structural 
transformations in social ecology—brought about in the mid-20th century by 
 economic growth, social emancipation, and consumer capitalism—generated not just 
new freedoms, opportunities, and affluence but also a new set of risks and problems. 
Chief among these problems was increased rates of crime and violence, a widespread 
phenomenon that gave rise to ‘high-crime societies’ and their associated cultural and 
political characteristics. I then traced how, from the mid-1970s onward, various actors 
within the state and civil society reacted to these new risks, producing, inter alia, a 
reactionary ‘culture of control’ with consequences for social and penal policy as well 
as for the conduct of everyday life. The decline of penal-welfarism, the rise of penal 
populism, the shift to a risk-averse criminal justice, the expansion of private security, 
and the emergence of mass imprisonment were all, or so I argued, concomitants of 
these late modern socio-economic transformations and the political and cultural 
adaptations that followed in their wake. 
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The Culture of Control is not a comparative study and it nowhere addresses the 
question of why America is an outlier in its use of penal power. But the book does 
deal with the interaction between changes at the level of social and economic struc-
tures, and changes in patterns of informal social control and state action. And it does 
highlight the role that criminal violence—and associated public fears, resentments, 
and political mobilisations—played in articulating these socio-economic develop-
ments and channeling a series of social and political responses to them. The Culture 
of Control argues that the effect of the economic and social changes of the post-war 
decades was to deplete existing social controls and to generate new risks, new crime 
opportunities, and higher levels of crime and violence. Over time, the collective 
 experience of crime and insecurity prompted a patterned response, both in state 
 agencies and in civil society—a response that I described as a new ‘culture of control’. 
It seems to me that this same analytical framework—linking economic and social 
structures to patterns of crime and punishment via an analysis of (formal and 
 informal) social control—can be put to work for our present purposes. In other words, 
the framework I developed for historical purposes in The Culture of Control can be 
reworked as a basis for thinking comparatively about American penality, highlighting 
the connections between America’s penal practices, its political, economic, and social 
structures, its patterns of informal social control, and the problems and policies to 
which these give rise.38
SOCIAL STRUCTURE, SOCIAL ORGANISATION, 
AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS
It is an established social science finding that high levels of crime, violence, and other 
social dislocations are associated with low levels of social capital, social integration 
and informal social control (Sampson, 1987; Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson & Wilson 
2005; Morenoff et al. 2001; McCarthy 2002). And a series of comparative research 
studies strongly suggests that social capital, social integration, and informal social 
control—in families, schools, communities, and neighbourhoods—are on average less 
developed and more unequally distributed in the US than in comparable nations; 
with areas of concentrated poverty and cumulative disadvantage in American cities 
exhibiting very serious levels of disorganisation and endemic social problems (Messner 
& Rosenfeld 1997; Avendano & Kawachi 2014; Darroch et al. 2001; Banks et al. 2010; 
38 Because it focused on parallel developments in the US and the UK, rather than contrasts between 
them, Garland (2001) said little about the role of America’s distinctive political system in shaping penal 
policy. For a detailed discussion of that issue, see Garland (2010).
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Singh & Kogan 2007; Williams & Collins 2001).39 America’s ‘social control deficits’—
which are preponderantly though by no means exclusively experienced by communi-
ties of colour40—exist for reasons that are historical and institutional, among which 
are the following: (i) long-term legacies of slavery, segregation, and discrimination 
(Wilson 2011); (ii) an extraordinary political commitment to free markets and private 
sector solutions (Garland 2016); and (iii) the under-development of a social state, 
especially as it affects the urban poor and people of colour (Katz 2013). In the past, 
programmes associated with the New Deal and the Great Society worked to reduce 
these problems, and succeeded to some extent (Jencks 2015). But since the rise to 
dominance of neoliberalism in the 1980s, American social and economic policies have 
mainly worked to reproduce these characteristics rather than alleviate them. 
Social and economic structures provide the settings in which civil society 
 institutions such as families, schools, churches, and communities undertake the 
 ongoing work of socialisation and social control, so it is hardly surprising that the 
chronic stresses imposed by these structures on certain sections of the population 
result in failures of social control and the emergence of social problems. These social 
and economic structures also provide the contexts in which governmental action is 
undertaken, so it is also no surprise that American welfare policies are designed to 
support and reinforce market relations and to de-emphasise social interventions that 
provide social and economic protections to those who are ill-served by market 
 processes. There is, in other words, a series of linkages that ties together America’s 
political economy, governmental processes, high levels of crime, and extraordinary 
levels of punishment. And this, it seems to me, is how we should frame the question 
of America’s extraordinary use of penal power. 
CONCLUSION
I have argued that we should think of American punishment not primarily as a form 
of retribution, or racial oppression, or neoliberal governance but as a specific form of 
penal power that emphasises control above everything else. Despite diverse local 
 concerns and motivating circumstances, the sentencing revolution of the last forty 
39 This finding does not necessarily confound the traditional Tocquevillian view of the US as a society 
with a weak state and a strongly associational civil society. Such strengths do exist, even if  they have been 
diminished in recent decades—see Putnam (2010). The point is that America’s very high levels of 
 inequality, together with minimalist state protections for poor communities and families, gives rise to 
communities that exhibit very high levels of disorganisation and dysfunction. 
40 Several recent studies have observed that sections of America’s white working class have recently been 
 experiencing serious problems of disorganisation and dysfunction: see Chen (2016).
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years has amounted to one long, cumulative process of extending, deepening, and 
guaranteeing penal control. American criminal justice has abandoned retributive 
 fundamentals such as ‘proportion’ and liberal principles such as ‘parsimony’ (Stuntz 
2013; Tonry 2016). The penalties that follow on a repeat offence have nothing to do 
with retributive proportion and everything to do with imposing control. The  sentences 
handed down to drug or sex offenders have little to do with culpability and everything 
to do with perceptions of dangerousness and disorder. And each element of America’s 
sentencing revolution expresses distrust of government, fear of dangerous criminals, 
and a public safety imperative demanding the incapacitation and control of anyone 
convicted of a crime.  
American criminal justice today is best understood not as a system of criminal 
punishment but as a system of penal control—a large-scale network of intensive, 
long-acting constraints and controls. Concerns about public safety and the need to 
impose control are explicitly and repeatedly stated in public discourse and in the 
 political arguments that were made to justify these penal measures.41 In the 1980s and 
1990s, representations of popular sentiment repeatedly revolved around questions of 
public safety and the need to protect innocent people from violent crime. Politicians 
presented their proposals not as harsh punishments or wild vengeance but as guaran-
teed, long-lasting, thoroughgoing controls. Prison works! Three Strikes and You’re 
Out! Life Without Prospect of Parole. Mandatory Sentences. Truth in Sentencing. 
The slogans say it loud and clear (Garland 2001). So too do today’s leading reform 
proposals, nearly all of which take care to preserve the imperative of penal control by 
targeting non-violent, non-repeat, non-sexual offenders (Gottschalk 2014).
American criminal justice is distinctively committed to what we might call ‘mass 
penal control’ because, as compared to other developed nations, American society 
exhibits an institutionalised pattern of social control deficits and because the American 
state is disposed to respond to these problems by means of penal control rather than 
by other means. The tragedy is that these penal control measures do little to address 
the underlying problems of social disorganisation, even if  they do succeed in curbing 
crime rates to some extent. Indeed, in these more fundamental respects, penal control 
is counterproductive, especially when exercised on a massive scale. It destroys human 
and social capital; it dis-integrates and excludes (Lynch & Sabol 2004; Moore 1996; 
Clear & Rose 1998; Rose & Clear 1998; Western et al. 2004). The penal controls of the 
state, exercised on a massive scale, work to undermine society’s capacity for social 
control, not to build that vital capacity.
41 As Foucault (2015) notes, we need not deploy hermeneutics or deep analysis in order to identify 
 strategic considerations: the aims of political actors can generally be read on the surface of their 
 statements and in the substance of what is said.  
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